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DOES THE JUDICIARY HAVE THE TOOLS FOR 
REGULATING GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS? 
Victor E. Schwartz,* Phil Goldberg** & Christopher E. Appel*** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,1 the Supreme Court of 
the United States spoke for the first time regarding the propriety of using 
common law tort actions to regulate greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions 
in the United States.  Eight state attorneys general, the City of New York, 
and several land trusts claimed a federal common law right of action 
against private and public energy companies to remedy alleged injuries 
associated with the “public nuisance” of global climate change.2  A 
unanimous Court rejected the claim.3  It held that the appropriate path 
for regulating GHG emissions is through the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) acting pursuant to congressional authority and that, 
through the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), Congress had displaced any federal 
common law action seeking to limit GHG emissions.4  The Court did not 
stop there.  It also stated that there is “no room for a parallel track” of 
tort litigation and issued a broad warning against global climate change 
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1 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
2 See id. at 2531–32. 
3 The Court rendered an 8–0 decision.  See id. at 2531.  Justice Sotomayor did not 
participate in the decision.  Id. 
4 Before the American Electric Power Co. decision, the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held 
that the CAA authorized the EPA to regulate emissions of four gases commonly 
characterized as GHGs, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007),  and that the EPA arbitrarily abdicated its 
statutory authority to do so in denying rulemaking, id. at 534; see infra Part II.B.1 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts). 
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litigation.5  It said the judiciary, given its limited tools, does not have the 
institutional competence to determine “[t]he appropriate amount of 
regulation” for sources of carbon dioxide given the impact such a 
decision would have on the “energy needs” of the American people.6 
Despite the strong sentiments the Court expressed in American Power 
Electric Co., commentators favoring climate change litigation have tried 
to limit the reach of the Court’s opinion.  Their main arguments fit into 
three categories.  First, they state that the Court’s displacement ruling 
did not bar this case or any other climate change tort suit from 
proceeding under a state’s common law.7  While the Court acknowledged 
its opinion focused only on federal common law claims, the state claims 
had been dropped from the case earlier in the proceedings.8  Second, 
they argue that common law tort suits that can be distinguished from the 
precise construct of American Electric Power Co. can proceed, including 
those brought by other types of plaintiffs or that seek other types of 
relief.  Third, they say the Court’s 4–4 split on the two constitutional 
questions—whether state attorneys general had constitutional standing 
to bring their claims and whether judicial remedies to limit fossil fuel 
emissions present innate political questions—was a victory for them.9  
They assert the split means there are no constitutional obstacles barring 
the judiciary from hearing any tort-based claim alleging that any 
defendant can be subject to liability for harms allegedly caused by global 
climate change. 
This Article addresses each of these arguments, focusing on the legal, 
public policy, and practical considerations the Court raised in American 
                                                 
5 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538. 
6 Id. at 2539. 
7 The Court reasoned “that the [CAA] and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any 
federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel 
fired power plants.”  Id. at 2537.  The Court distinguished this analysis from a finding that 
the CAA preempted any state tort action in this area, and left the decision open on the 
availability of such remedies for further consideration on remand.  Id. at 2540; see infra Part 
II.B (examining the progress of climate change litigation from Massachusetts to American 
Electric Power Co.). 
8 The plaintiffs in American Electric Power Co. had sought relief under state law where 
the defendants operate power plants, but because the Second Circuit ruled that the federal 
common law claim governed the case and “[n]one of the parties have briefed preemption 
or otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law,” the Supreme 
Court did not address the state claims.  131 S. Ct. at 2540. 
9 See id.; Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change 
Regulation:  Implications of AEP v. Connecticut, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 447, 451 (2012) (“The most 
important jurisprudential issues raised in the [American Electric Power Co.] appeal are 
standing . . . and the political question doctrine.”). 
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Electric Power Co.10  (In an article published before American Electric Power 
Co. was decided, we investigated the doctrinal issues with using the tort 
of public nuisance to regulate GHG emissions.11)  Part II of the Article 
begins the discussion by putting global climate change litigation into 
context.  First, the Article contextualizes the regulation of GHGs within 
the historical, multi-faceted development of U.S. energy policy.12  It 
explains the complexity of focusing in isolation on any single 
component, no matter its importance, of the nation’s energy policy.13  
Second, it puts American Electric Power Co. into the context of other 
lawsuits seeking to have courts determine America’s energy policy based 
solely on environmental allegations with fossil fuels.14  Part III focuses on 
the message the Court delivered in American Electric Power Co., 
discussing what the Court’s ruling means for other climate change 
cases.15  Part IV analyzes the public policy consequences and “real 
world” impacts of isolating and establishing GHG emission limits 
through the judiciary.16 
The Article concludes that federal and state judiciaries, given their 
institutional constraints, do not have the capabilities to establish GHG 
emission limits in an effective, consistent, and nondiscriminatory 
manner.  It also shows that the Supreme Court, in American Electric Power 
Co., provided a blueprint and broad mandate for state and federal courts 
to reject any claim that would “regulate” GHG emissions. 
II.  THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO U.S. ENERGY 
POLICY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE TORT LITIGATION 
A. Regulating GHGs as Part of the Development of U.S. Energy Policy 
Since the Industrial Revolution, energy and, as a result, energy 
policy have become integral to American social and political landscapes.  
American society requires energy sources to fuel many aspects of daily 
life, from electrifying homes and businesses, to enabling transportation 
                                                 
10 The Court in American Electric Power Co. expressly cautioned that it “endorse[d] no 
particular view of the complicated issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions and climate 
change.”  131 S. Ct at 2533 n.2. 
11 See Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Corey Schaecher, Why Trial Courts Have Been 
Quick to Cool “Global Warming” Suits, 77 TENN. L. REV. 803, 834 (2010). 
12 See infra Part II (examining the development of the U.S. energy policy and global 
warming cases in a judicial context). 
13 See infra Part II.A (discussing the national energy policy and regulation of GHGs). 
14 See infra Part II.B (discussing tort law allegations in courts regarding GHG limits). 
15 See infra Part III (analyzing the Court’s decision in American Electric Power Co. and its 
effect on global climate change law). 
16 See infra Part IV (examining the real world effects and the public policy concerns of the 
Court’s decision). 
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and so much more.17  As the population has grown and technology has 
flourished, the need for energy has steadily increased.  Over the past 
sixty years, energy consumption has tripled,18 and by 2035, U.S. energy 
consumption is projected to increase by another fifteen percent.19  
Traditionally, the focal point of American energy policy has been to 
assure a continuous, affordable supply of energy to satisfy this demand.   
Recent brown-outs in California and spikes in gasoline above four 
dollars per gallon have demonstrated the personal and economic 
hardships that can result when aspects of U.S. energy policy fail, even for 
a short period of time.  Accordingly, for more than a hundred years, 
lawmakers have prioritized energy sources that are capable of large scale 
production and are relatively inexpensive and relatively safe.  Those 
sources have consisted primarily of fossil fuels, namely coal, oil, and 
natural gas.20  Together, these fuels account for eighty-three percent of 
U.S. energy production.21  Any change in America’s energy policy 
involving these fossil fuels, therefore, must fully consider the impact that 
change would have on the ways the United States produces and uses 
energy, including the affordability of electricity and gasoline for 
American consumers, the nation’s global competiveness, foreign policy 
dynamics, and national security interests.22  Concerns of 
environmentalists, including over GHG emissions represent only one 
                                                 
17 See Rick Strange, Weaving A Tangled Web:  The Intersection of Energy Policy and Broader 
Government Policies, 5 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 3 (2009) (stating that “Americans 
devour energy prodigiously” and “[b]ecause we consume so much energy, ensuring our 
access to it is a vital national concern”). 
18 See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=us_energy_use (last updated July 
20, 2011). 
19 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0484, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 
2010 (2010), available at www.eia.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html. 
20 See Mark Clayton, ‘Fracking’:  Did Energy Department Report Clear Up Controversy?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 11, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 15949774 (discussing the 
“dramatic rise” in natural-gas production “from about [two] percent of America’s gas 
supply a decade ago to about [thirty] percent today” as a result of “fracking” 
advancements); Peter S. Glaser, F. William Brownell & Victor E. Schwartz, Managing Coal:  
How to Achieve Reasonable Risk with an Essential Resource, 13 VERMONT ENVTL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 11) (on file with authors) (detailing the major risks of 
mainstream energy sources). 
21 See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, supra note 18. 
22 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); see also Control of Emissions 
from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003) 
(stating EPA position that “climate change raises important foreign policy issues”); Leon 
Fuerth, Energy, Homeland, and National Security, in ENERGY & SECURITY:  TOWARD A NEW 
FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY 411 (Jan H. Kalicki & David L. Goldwyn eds., 2005) (discussing 
relationship between energy costs and national security interests). 
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aspect of the U.S. energy policy and must be integrated into this 
kaleidoscope. 
1. Environmentalism as a Factor in U.S. Energy Policy 
In the 1970s, policy issues relating to emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other GHGs reached the national dialogue.  This occurred at the 
same time the environmental political movement secured significant 
legislative victories.23  During that decade, Congress passed seminal 
pieces of environmental legislation, namely the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”),24 the CAA,25 and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).26  
These statutes, although not directly addressing energy production or 
policy, established that the assessment of environmental impacts would 
have to be a factor in developing national policies for a range of areas.27 
Legislation specifically addressing environmental impacts of energy 
production and use soon emerged.  In 1975, Congress established 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) standards for automotive 
vehicles sold in the United States.28  The EPA was authorized to set 
CAFE standards at the “maximum feasible level” considering, among 
other things, “[t]echnological feasibility,” “[e]conomic practicability,” 
                                                 
23 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States 
Environmental Law:  Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United States, 
20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 76 (2001). 
24 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4327 (2006)).  In the late 1990s, and continuing 
into the 2000s, various groups have used the NEPA to “assert[] climate change claims.”  
Kevin T. Haroff, On Thin Air:  Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 411, 414 (2012). 
25 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407–7642 (2006)); see History of the Clean Air Act, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/caa_history.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2010).  The 
precursor to the CAA was the Air Pollution Control Act.  Id.; see Air Pollution Control Act, 
Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q 
(2006)).  It funded research into the scope and sources of air pollution.  History of the Clean 
Air Act, supra.  The initial CAA was passed in 1963, establishing a national program to 
address air pollution within the U.S. Public Health Service and authorizing additional 
research into techniques for monitoring and controlling air pollution.  Id.  It was 
significantly amended in 1970 to include substantive provisions and has been subsequently 
amended, most notably in 1977 and 1990.  Id. 
26  Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).  
27 See Mark Latham, Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Intersection of Tort 
and Environmental Law:  Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 
742–46 (2011) (discussing the seminal environmental legislation enacted in the 1970s). 
28 See CAFE—Fuel Economy, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2011). 
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and the national “[n]eed . . . to conserve energy.”29  These standards have 
increased gradually over time, encouraging more fuel efficient vehicles.30 
Congress has followed a similar incremental approach with regard 
to global climate change allegations.  The initial focus was on learning.  
In 1978, Congress established a “national climate program” to increase 
general knowledge “through research, data collection, assessments, 
information dissemination, and international cooperation.”31  In 1980, 
Congress commissioned a National Academy of Sciences study through 
the Energy Security Act to analyze the “projected impact, on the level of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, of fossil fuel combustion, coal-
conversion and related synthetic fuels activities.”32  In 1990, Congress 
enacted the Global Changes Research Act to establish a ten-year research 
program for global climate issues.33 
This learning phase has given way to two decades of strategic 
initiatives toward reducing GHG emissions.  Domestically, Congress has 
focused on a  multi-disciplinary approach, enacting numerous subsidies 
and tax incentives aimed at two goals: to modernize fossil fuel 
production to reduce GHG emissions and to spur development of 
alternative energy sources that emit fewer GHGs.34  For example, in his 
2010 State of the Union speech, President Obama said that his national 
                                                 
29 See CAFE Overview—Frequently Asked Questions, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/ 
cars/rules/cafe/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
30 See Nelson D. Schwartz, American Energy Policy, Asleep at the Spigot, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 6, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/business/06oil.html?pagewanted=all 
(“Between 1974 and 1989, the efficiency of a typical car sold in the United States almost 
doubled, to 27.5 miles per gallon from 13.8.”). 
31 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 
52,927 (Sept. 8, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32 Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, § 711(a)(1), 94 Stat. 611, 774 (1980). 
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 2931−2939 (2006). 
34 See, e.g., Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(proposing a cap and trade program to reduce GHG emissions by eighty-three percent in 
2050); American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(proposing a comprehensive cap and trade program); Safe Climate Act of 2006, H.R. 5642, 
109th Cong. (2006) (proposing amendments to the CAA to achieve two percent annual 
reductions in GHGs between 2010 and 2050); Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 
3698, 109th Cong. (2006) (providing a comprehensive set of amendments to the CAA aimed 
at reducing GHGs).  Members of Congress have also sponsored bills that would assist state 
efforts to reduce GHGs.  See PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 5766, 111th 
Cong. (2010) (proposing to amend Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac underwriting standards to 
support state clean energy loan programs); PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2010, S. 
3642, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing a plan identical to the plan set forth in H.R. 5766); H.R. 
3836, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a DOE credit program “to enhance the availability of 
private financing for clean energy technology deployment”). 
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energy policy includes continued investment in clean coal technology.35  
He subsequently issued a presidential memorandum instructing federal 
officials to work toward “[r]apid commercial development and 
deployment of clean coal technologies” that “will help position the 
United States as a leader in the global clean energy race.”36  With regard 
to alternative and renewable energy sources, about a third of the cost of 
solar and wind energy is paid for through subsidies and tax incentives.  
Together, wind, solar, biomass, hydroelectric power, and other 
alternative energy sources account for about eight percent of U.S. energy 
production and continue to expand.37 
Internationally, presidential administrations of both political parties 
have sought to develop a global international consensus on approaches 
to GHGs.  American policymakers have been keenly aware that any 
unilateral action on GHG emissions would significantly and 
disproportionately increase the cost of energy in the United States.  For 
example, in 1992, President George H. W. Bush signed the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), 
which was a nonbinding agreement between 154 nations designed to 
reduce atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other GHGs in 
order to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
[Earth’s] climate system.”38  UNFCCC member nations negotiated the 
Kyoto Protocol that called for mandatory reductions of GHG emissions 
of developed nations.39 
                                                 
35 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-
address. President Obama’s predecessor, George W. Bush, also supported development of 
clean coal technology. See, e.g., Robin Acton, Bush Urges Clean Coal Technology for Electricity, 
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/ 
news/s_580555.html. 
36 Press Release, The White House, Presidential Memorandum—A Comprehensive 
Federal Strategy on Carbon Capture and Storage (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-a-comprehensive-
federal-strategy-carbon-capture-and-storage. 
37 See What is Energy? Explained:  Sources of Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=about_sources_of_energy (last 
updated July 27, 2011).  These sources, including biofuels, wind, solar, and hydroelectric 
power cannot power base-load electricity plants or broadly fuel the transportation 
industry.  See C. Boyden Gray & Andrew R. Varcoe, Octane, Clean Air, and Renewable Fuels:  
A Modest Step Toward Energy Independence, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 9, 12–15 (2005); Blair H. 
Moses, The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007:  Can Biotechnology Help Overcome 
Potential Obstacles to Meeting Its Energy Goals?, 3 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 
41, 56–59 (2010). 
38 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
39 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 
I.L.M. 22. 
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In 1997, President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol, but did not 
present it for ratification to the U.S. Senate, which expressed concern that 
the economic burdens of reducing carbon dioxide emissions would fall 
on industrialized nations.40  Subsequently, President George W. Bush 
opposed the Kyoto Protocol, stating that it exempted developing nations, 
did not include two major types of pollutants, and would have had a 
significant negative economic impact on the United States.41  President 
Obama participated in the Copenhagen Climate Conference that 
considered renewing the Kyoto Protocol, which is set to expire in 2012, 
and encouraged all nations to reduce GHG emissions.  The conference 
resulted in a limited, non-binding agreement called the Copenhagen 
Accord.42  This led to a December 2011 agreement by a conference of 194 
countries to negotiate a new accord for binding emissions targets that 
would include the developing world, which is where most of the new 
sources of emissions are located.43  As these efforts have shown, building 
global consensus takes time, but is achievable. 
2. Balancing Environmentalism with Other Factors is Central to U.S. 
Energy Policy 
U.S. policymakers have carefully balanced the above changes in 
GHG-related public policies against other aspects of U.S. energy policy, 
most notably the need to reduce dependence on foreign energy sources.44  
These issues have played out most dramatically with petroleum-based 
products, such as oil and gasoline, that are largely used in the 
transportation sector and for heating homes.45  When demand for oil 
                                                 
40 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
41  See Bush:  Kyoto Treaty Would Have Hurt Economy, MSNBC.COM (June 30, 2005, 4:50 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8422343/ns/politics/t/bush-kyoto-treaty-would-have-
hurt-economy/. 
42 See Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–19, 2009, 
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, 4–9, U.N. DOC. 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/ 
cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4; see also William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the 
Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. 
INT'L L. 457, 457 (2010) (“The 2009 United Nations Climate Conference in Copenhagen has 
been widely viewed as a failure.”). 
43 See Arthur Max, Climate Conference President Says Agreement Reached on Course for 
Future Global Warming Talks, CANADIAN BUS. (Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.canadian 
business.com/article/61395--climate-conference-president-says-agreement-reached-on-
course-for-future-global-warming-talks. 
44 See JAY HAKES, A DECLARATION OF ENERGY INDEPENDENCE 15–20 (2008) (discussing 
the rapid growth in energy demand and policies employed by the United States to meet 
demand). 
45 The transportation sector comprises approximately twenty-eight percent of the end-
use energy in the United States, of which about ninety-five percent comes from petroleum 
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grew after World War II, the United States became a net importer of oil 
for the first time.46  By the late 1950s, the country could no longer 
produce enough energy to meet its consumption.47  Now, the United 
States consumes about twenty million barrels of oil per day, though it 
domestically produces less than half of that amount.48  The remainder is 
imported from Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria, 
among other countries.49  These dynamics have placed considerable 
pressure on the United States to ally with countries hostile to American 
interests and have influenced U.S. military actions.50  
U.S. policymakers have appreciated that energy shortages, whether 
caused by foreign influence or other factors, can have severe economic 
consequences for Americans of average means.  In 2008, for example, 
when oil prices skyrocketed to over $145 a barrel,51 causing gasoline 
prices to similarly soar to record highs,52 the U.S. economy plunged 
further into a recession.53  For some hourly workers, the increased cost of 
                                                                                                             
products.  See Use of Energy in the United States Explained, supra note 18.  For a discussion of 
petroleum-based product usage in heating homes, see What is Energy?, supra note 37. 
46 See HAKES, supra note 44, at 13; see also VITO A. STAGLIANO, A POLICY OF DISCONTENT:  
THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 2–69 (2001) (describing the rise of natural 
resources planning during the presidencies of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry 
Truman). 
47 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0384, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2010, at xix 
(2010), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf. 
48 In 2010, the United States produced around 7.5 million barrels of oil per day and 
consumed approximately 19.15 million barrels per day.  See Oil:  Crude and Petroleum 
Products Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/ 
index.cfm?page=oil_home (click “Data & Statistics” tab) (last updated July 5, 2011).  In 
comparison, the United States, in 2001, domestically produced around eight million barrels 
daily and consumed approximately 19.65 million barrels per day; consumption exceeded 
twenty million barrels per day throughout most of the previous decade.  See Luis E. 
Cuervo, OPEC From Myth to Reality, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 433, 446–47 (2008); Alex Kowalski, 
Trade Deficit of U.S. Unexpectedly Surges on Increase in Crude-Oil Imports, BLOOMBERG (July 
12, 2011, 3:07 P.M), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-12/trade-deficit-of-u-s-
unexpectedly-surges-on-increase-in-crude-oil-imports.html; Historical Data Graphs per Year, 
INDEXMUNDI.COM, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=88&v=91&v=93&c=us&l= 
en (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
49 See Robert Rapier, Top 10 Sources for U.S. Oil in 2009, CONSUMER ENERGY REP. (Feb. 3, 
2012, 4:55 PM), http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2010/01/25/top-10-sources-for-
u-s-oil-for-2009/. 
50 See, e.g., Arthur Rizer, The National Security Threat of Energy Dependence:  A Call for A 
Nuclear Renaissance, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 193, 199–200 (2011) (tracing the relationship 
between United States’ oil interests and war). 
51 See Rebekah Kebede, Oil Hits Record Over $145, REUTERS (July 3, 2008, 8:28 PM), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/07/03/us-markets-oil-idUKT14048520080703. 
52 See id. 
53 See James C. Cooper, When Oil Prices Double, Recession Often Follows, FISCAL TIMES 
(Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/04/25/When-Oil-Prices-
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getting back and forth from a job made keeping those jobs infeasible 
after taxes, day care, and other such working-related expenses were 
calculated.  Other impacts rippled throughout the U.S. economy, such as 
higher prices on food and other staples, which were felt broadly by 
many Americans.54 
This relationship between affordable energy and the ability of 
Americans to meet their most basic needs has forced Congress to 
prioritize the goal of energy independence.  While challenges on this 
front continue with petroleum-based products, there has been much 
success with the major sources of energy for electricity, including coal, 
natural gas, and nuclear power.  In 1946, Congress enacted the Atomic 
Energy Act to spur development of nuclear energy for base-load 
electricity and establish a regulatory body, the Atomic Energy 
Commission.55  In 1974, in response to the first oil crisis of the 1970s, 
Congress enacted legislation prohibiting power plants from relying on 
petroleum or natural gas as their primary source of power.56  In 1978, 
Congress restricted construction of new power plants using oil or natural 
gas as a base load fuel, encouraging reliance on coal and nuclear 
energy.57  Congress also enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act in 1978,58 which marked an initial departure from the electricity 
regulatory model established by the Federal Power Act of 1920 and 
subsequent amendments in the 1930s,59 and opened the path to greater 
competition in electric energy markets.60  More recently, Congress 
                                                                                                             
Double-Recession-Often-Follows.aspx#page1 (discussing the relationship between rising 
oil prices and economic decline). 
54 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF HIGH OIL PRICES ON THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 2 (2004), available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/npsum/high_ 
oil04sum.pdf; see also Rizer, supra note 50, at 241 (describing the impact oil imports have on 
the U.S. balance of trade); Ambuj D. Sagar, Hongyan H. Oliver & Ananth P. Chikkatur, 
Climate Change, Energy, and Developing Countries, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 4 (2006) (discussing 
disproportionate impacts of energy supply shortages on developing countries). 
55 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006).  The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the Atomic 
Energy Commission and re-assigned its functions to two new agencies, the Energy 
Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  See 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5891 (2006)). 
56 Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 2, 
88 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 792–798 (2006)). 
57 Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8484 (2006)). 
58 See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 15, 16, 42, and 43 U.S.C.). 
59 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006). 
60 See Jeffery S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of Electricity Law, Policy, and Regulation:  A Look 
Back, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 33, 34–35 (2010). 
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enacted the Energy Policy Act in 1992,61 which gave rise to independent 
power producers,62 the Energy Policy Act of 2005,63 and the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007.64 
The initiatives advancing domestic production of fossil fuels all 
occurred at the same time Congress and the EPA were responding to 
concerns raised by environmental groups about global climate change.65  
U.S. energy policy has emphasized measured, balanced, and incremental 
solutions.   
3. Climate Change Litigation is a Result of Frustration with this 
Balanced Approach 
In the early 2000s, some environmentalists became frustrated with 
the need for this balanced, incremental approach.66  They lamented that, 
as demonstrated by the recent failure of Congress to pass cap and trade 
legislation, the political will has never developed in the United States for 
environmental concerns over fossil fuel emissions to outweigh the other 
factors, such that the country would unilaterally limit GHG emissions.67  
                                                 
61 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12, 16, 25, 26, 30, and 42 U.S.C.). 
62 See Dennis, supra note 60, at 35. 
63 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 7, 10, 15, 16, 22, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).  
64 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 15, 40, 42, and 46 U.S.C.); see also Alison C. 
Graab, Note, The Smart Grid:  A Smart Solution to a Complicated Problem, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2051, 2067–71 (2011) (discussing key provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007). 
65 Even as U.S. policymakers were taking active steps with regards to global climate 
change allegations, “energy planners have [consistently] turned [back] to coal as an 
intermediate term (fifty to 100 years) or long-term (more than 100 years) energy source.”  
A. Dan Tarlock, Western Coal in Context, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 315, 318 (1982). 
66 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the 
Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 246–53 (2011); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Electric 
Power in a Carbon Constrained World, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 821, 837–79 
(2010); Dennis, supra note 60, at 34–35; see also Darren M. Springer, States Lead by Example on 
Energy Policy, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 29 (2008) (discussing state efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions). 
67 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE COSTS OF REDUCING GREENHOUSE-GAS 
EMISSIONS (2009) [hereinafter CBO, COSTS OF REDUCING GHGS] (analyzing the costs of 
various congressional proposals to reduce GHGs); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS (2009) [hereinafter CBO,  
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION] (analyzing the economic impact of congressional 
proposals to reduce GHGs).  According to the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), the 
proposed cap-and-trade provision in H.R. 2454 would reduce the United States’ gross 
domestic product (“GDP”) and would lead to slightly higher unemployment.  CBO,  COSTS 
OF REDUCING GHGs, supra, at 2.  Additionally, the CBO estimates that the American Clean 
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The advocates filed several legal actions, including American Electric 
Power Co., to force GHG limits through litigation. 
With surprising candor, the lawyers acknowledged that the private 
tort suits, which were part of the overall litigation approach, were 
designed to force Congress and regulators to limit GHGs, not to actually 
subject the named companies to liability.68  For example, Connecticut 
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, the lead attorney general in 
American Electric Power Co., said the suit was based on his “gut feeling 
[and] emotion, that CO2 pollution and global warming were problems 
that needed to be addressed,” and they were “brainstorming about what 
could be done” because action “wasn’t coming from the federal 
government.”69  Echoed Maine Attorney General Stephen Rowe: “[I]t’s a 
shame that we’re here, here we are trying to sue polluters who are 
polluting because the federal government is being inactive.”70  Even 
Second Circuit Judge Peter Hall, who authored the Second Circuit 
opinion in American Electric Power Co. allowing the case to continue, has 
since conceded that “[y]ou really don’t want a district judge supervising 
your relief in all of this stuff,” but “[t]o the extent there is out 
there . . . some opportunity to pursue or continue to pursue a nuisance 
action, that may help in a political sense.”71 
B. Global Warming Allegations in the Courtroom 
1. Massachusetts v. EPA 
The first significant GHG emissions-related lawsuit was 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which sought to directly force the political 
                                                                                                             
Energy and Security Act of 2009 would lead to a reduction in GDP between 2015 and 2050.  
CBO, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION, supra, at 11. 
68 See, e.g., Robert Meltz, Cong. Research Serv., RL 32764, Climate Change Litigation: A 
Growing Phenomenon 1 (2008) (“Many proponents of litigation or unilateral state action 
freely concede that such initiatives are make-do efforts that, while making a small 
contribution to mitigating climate change, are also aimed at prodding the national 
government to act.”); see also Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, 
and 9/11:  Exploring Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2009) 
(“Climate change litigation of various kinds is clearly on the rise, and the trend is to hold 
that potential damage from climate change is a legally cognizable injury.”). 
69 Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy, 30 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335, 339 (2005) [hereinafter Role of State Attorneys General].  Attorney 
General Blumenthal led the first joint climate-change action.  See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. 
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
70 Role of State Attorneys General, supra note 69, at 342–43. 
71 Key Judge Downplays Prospects for Successful Climate Change Suits, CLEAN ENERGY REP. 
(Mar. 2, 2010), http://cleanenergyreport.com/20100302102610/Carbon-Control-Daily-
News/News/key-judge-downplays-prospects-for-successful-climate-damages-
suits/menu-id-202.html (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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branches of government—namely the EPA—to regulate GHG 
emissions.72  In this case, more than twenty parties—including twelve 
states, four territorial and local governments, and numerous trade 
associations73—petitioned for a review of the EPA’s 2003 denial of a 
rulemaking request to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles.74  
The EPA denied the request on the grounds that the agency did not have 
the authority to regulate the emissions,75 and alternatively asserted that 
even if it did have the authority, the piecemeal approach of regulating 
emissions solely for vehicles would conflict with the President’s 
comprehensive approach to climate change.76 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, because GHGs fit within 
Congress’s definition of pollutants, EPA has statutory authority to 
regulate the GHG emissions under the CAA.77  As a result, the Supreme 
                                                 
72 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007). 
73 Id.  Petitioners included California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.  Id. at 
505 n.2.  New York City, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C., the territory of American 
Samoa, and many private organizations, including the Center for Biological Diversity, 
Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, 
Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for 
Technology Assessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, and U.S. Public Interest Research 
Group also joined in the action.  Id. at 505 n.3–4. 
74 See id. at 505 (stating that the questions before the Court included “whether EPA has 
the statutory authority to regulate [GHG] emissions from new motor vehicles; and if so, 
whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so are consistent with the statute”); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (empowering the EPA Administrator to promulgate regulations 
governing air pollution from automobiles).  Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA provides the EPA 
Administrator with authority to: 
[P]rescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the 
provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any 
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new 
motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, 
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare. 
Id. 
75 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528; see also Control of Emissions From New Highway 
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003) (noting that previous EPA 
General Counsels addressed the issue of EPA’s authority to set control requirements for 
CO2 emissions).  They found that the CAA definition of “air pollutant” included CO2 and 
therefore could be subject to regulation under the CAA if the applicable statutory criteria 
was met; both previous General Counsels also noted that the Agency had not made the 
requisite findings for such CO2 emissions regulation.  Id. 
76 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528. 
77 See id. at 528 (noting that the EPA’s argument that it lacked the authority under the 
CAA to regulate new vehicle emissions because carbon dioxide is not considered an air 
pollutant as defined in the Act was incorrect); see also Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 
U.S. 561, 570–71 (2007) (concerning whether an energy company violated the CWA when it 
Schwartz et al.: Does the Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas E
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
382 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
Court set forth a means for EPA, should it decide to do so, to regulate 
GHG emissions pursuant to the Agency’s congressional authority.  Thus, 
Massachusetts v. EPA settled an issue of administrative law.  The issue was 
solely whether the EPA’s denial of a petition for a regulatory rulemaking 
was “arbitrary, capricious . . . or otherwise not in accordance with 
[statutory] law.”78  Such a review of administrative procedure and 
statutory interpretation is firmly within the province of the judiciary.79  
As it has made clear since, the Supreme Court was neither creating an 
avenue for courts to limit emissions nor subjecting private-sector 
interests to liability for contributing to global GHG emissions.80 
2. Federal District Court Cases Against Private Entities 
Soon after Massachusetts v. EPA was filed, four major global climate 
change tort lawsuits were launched against private-sector entities, 
namely the nation’s largest utility, energy, and automobile companies.81  
These suits generally claim that the companies engaged in operations or 
made products that contributed to the build-up of GHGs in the 
atmosphere, causing the earth to warm, thereby creating a “public 
nuisance.”82  As discussed in Part I of this Article, the first of these cases, 
                                                                                                             
modified its coal power plants without first obtaining a permit); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. 
Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959–60 (D. Or. 2006) (alleging a violation of the 
CAA for constructing a GHG-producing facility without a permit); James L. Arnone et al., 
Global Climate Change Litigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION:  LAW AND STRATEGY 11–12 
(Cary R. Perlman ed., 2009) (stating that the CAA empowers the EPA to set National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) to protect public health and the environment).  
Notably, only two published cases involve actions against the energy industry under the 
CAA, the most logical statute under which to bring claims related to GHG emissions.  “The 
dearth of cases discussing [CAA] violations related to global climate change reflects the fact 
that the fight still centers on federal and state GHG regulation, not enforcement.”  Id. at 12. 
78 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8) (2006). 
80 See Arnone et al., supra note 77, at 8 (“Although the case is remarkable in itself, it was 
only the beginning of the wave of climate change litigation that the [United States] is now 
experiencing.” (footnote omitted)). 
81 See generally Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(bringing suit against American Electric Power, a utility company), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d 
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. 
Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (bringing suit against utility, energy, and oil companies); 
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 
2007) (bringing suit against multiple automobile manufacturers); Comer v. Murphy Oil 
USA, Inc., 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (bringing suit 
against various oil and energy companies), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), appeal 
dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
82 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (noting that allegations for common law public nuisance were attributed to 
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Connecticut v. American Electric Power, Co.,83 was brought by several state 
attorneys general,84 who sued to enjoin the defendant energy 
companies85 to reduce their emissions of GHGs by specific percentages 
for a minimum of ten years.86  In California v. General Motors Corp.,87 the 
California attorney general sought to subject car manufacturers to 
liability for making cars that emit GHGs through vehicle exhaust.88  
Finally, two cases, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. and Native Village of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,89 were filed by private individuals seeking 
to recover damages caused by weather-related events, including 
Hurricane Katrina, they alleged were caused or made more intense by 
global climate change.90 
Federal district court judges in each case dismissed the claims as 
non-justiciable.91  They concluded that deciding which GHG emitters in 
                                                                                                             
global warming which will allegedly cause irreparable harm to citizens and the 
environment). 
83 Id. 
84 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267.  Respondents included Connecticut, New 
York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the City of 
New York.  Id.  This lawsuit was opposed by state attorneys general from more than 
twenty other states.  See Brief of the States of Indiana, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. 
Connecticut (Feb. 7, 2011) (No. 10-174). 
85 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267.  Petitioners named American Electric 
Power Co., American Electric Power Service Corporation (together, “AEP”), the Southern 
Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy, Inc., and Cinergy Corporation as 
defendants. 
86 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (noting that the plaintiffs sought injunctive 
relief requiring the defendants to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions for “at least a 
decade” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
87 No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). 
88 See id. at *1 (alleging that the six defendants produce vehicles that emit over 289 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide, which represents over twenty percent of the human-
generated carbon dioxide emissions in the United States). 
89 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. 
Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th 
Cir. 2010); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 
2009). 
90  See Comer, 585 F.3d at 859 (alleging that defendants’ emissions of GHGs resulted in 
global warming, which increased sea levels and therefore added to the catastrophe of 
Hurricane Katrina); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (alleging that global warming caused 
by defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions caused harsher winter storms, which resulted in 
erosion of the Kivalina coast). 
91 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883 (holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to 
bring claims and the questions presented were barred by the political question doctrine); 
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal. 
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the United States should be subject to liability for global changes in 
weather patterns was an inherently political—not judicial—function.92  
As the American Electric Power, Co. trial court stated, “[t]he scope and 
magnitude of the relief [p]laintiffs seek reveals the transcendently 
legislative nature of this litigation.”93  To adjudicate the claims, the trial 
courts concluded they would have to cap defendants’ emissions “by 
judicial fiat.”94  This would require courts to determine appropriate 
levels of GHG emissions; whether liability should rest with only a small 
segment of the industry; and the economic and national security 
implications of curtailing these emissions.95  The American Electric Power, 
Co. trial court also stated that, “[b]ecause resolution of the issues 
presented here requires identification and balancing of economic, 
environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests, ‘an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion’ is 
required.”96  Such weighing of interests, the court reasoned, is 
“consigned to the political branches, not the [j]udiciary.”97  Otherwise, 
the courts would be “exposing automakers, utility companies, and other 
industries to damages flowing from a new judicially-created tort for 
doing nothing more than lawfully engaging in their respective spheres of 
commerce within those [s]tates.”98 
Even though Comer and Kivalina were brought by private plaintiffs, 
not state attorneys general, the trial judges viewed the lawsuits in the 
same light as the other cases.  Judge Dennis, in Comer, said the claims 
were embodiments of the ongoing “debate” over global climate change 
policy that “simply has no place in the court” until Congress sets 
standards that judges and juries can apply to decide cases:  “These policy 
decisions are best left to the executive and legislative branches of the 
government, who are not only in the best position to make those 
decisions but are constitutionally empowered to do so.”99  The Kivalina 
trial judge decried that the lack of judicially discoverable and 
                                                                                                             
Sept. 17, 2007); Comer, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
92 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 871; Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *6–8; Am. Elec. 
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272, (noting that decisions of this nature are best left to the 
legislative and executive branches and are not to be resolved by the judiciary); see also 
Comer, 585 F.3d at 860 n.2 (summarizing trial judge’s ruling from the bench). 
93 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272. 
94 Id. at 274. 
95 Id. at 272. 
96 Id. at 274 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)). 
97 Id. 
98 California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (citation omitted). 
99 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 585 F.3d 855, 860 n.2 (2009). 
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manageable standards prohibited courts from “render[ing] a decision 
that is principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.”100 
These courts also explained that the “global” scope of these cases 
made climate change claims completely different from traditional public 
nuisance cases in which plaintiffs have successfully established liability 
for discrete, identifiable sources of pollution.101  As the trial judge in 
General Motors stated, “there are multiple worldwide sources of 
atmospheric warming across myriad industries and multiple 
countries.”102  Further, the Kivalina judge wrote, “there is no realistic 
possibility of tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to 
any particular emissions by any specific person, entity, group [sic] at any 
particular point in time,” or at any particular place.103   
As a result, there are endless combinations and permutations of 
plaintiffs and defendants with no “manageable method of discerning the 
entities that are creating and contributing to the alleged nuisance.”104  
This allows the plaintiffs to be in the position of picking winners and 
losers in the global climate change debate, as the litigation demonstrates 
their “political judgment that the two dozen [d]efendants . . . should be 
the only ones to bear the cost of contributing to global warming.” 105 This 
situation, Comer continued, created “daunting evidentiary problems” for 
showing that any individual defendant’s GHG emissions “affected the 
weather system.”106  In short, the significant trial management challenges 
these cases presented were judicially insurmountable and, as the trial 
judges ruled, raised constitutional concerns implicating the political 
question doctrine.107 
Despite the trial courts’ consensus, a panel of the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in American Electric Power, Co. and, initially, a panel of 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Comer disagreed.  Both courts, 
                                                 
100 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(citing Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
101 Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *15. 
102 Id. 
103 Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 880. 
104 Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *15. 
105 Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 877. 
106 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *4 
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007). 
107 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883, 880 (stating that the plaintiffs claim was barred, 
and granting defendants’ motion to dismiss); Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *15 
(noting that the court was left without a manageable method of discerning the creators of 
the alleged nuisance); Comer, 2006 WL 1066645, at *3 (noting that the broad classes of 
parties is not practical for this type of civil suit); Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 
267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that the questions presented are not ones for the judiciary to 
answer). 
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within weeks of each other, overturned the lower court dismissals and 
allowed the cases to proceed, though the Fifth Circuit later vacated that 
ruling.108  The Second Circuit ruling, in particular, provided a major 
appellate victory for regulating GHG emissions through the judiciary.109  
It set forth a robust view of common law torts to gap fill federal 
legislation, stating that until federal laws and regulations address global 
climate change, “federal courts will be empowered to appraise the 
equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by [GHGs].”110  
Meanwhile, California’s attorney general voluntarily withdrew the claim 
in General Motors,111 and Kivalina is still pending in the Ninth Circuit.112 
3. The Supreme Court’s Ruling in American Electric Power Co. v. 
Connecticut 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Second Circuit case, 
marking the first time the High Court had agreed to hear a tort-based 
dispute alleging direct harm from global climate change.  The Court 
unanimously reversed the Second Circuit’s holding that had allowed the 
case to proceed on federal common law public nuisance grounds.   
In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that 
because Congress, through the CAA, “delegated to EPA the decision 
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions” of the 
defendants, it acted to “displace[] [any] federal common law” right of 
action that might have existed.113  The Court made clear that 
                                                 
108 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the district court erred in dismissing the complaints on political question grounds and that 
plaintiffs had standing to bring the claims); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 
(5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that plaintiffs had standing to assert claims and that those 
claims did not present nonjusticiable political questions); see also Comer v. Murphy Oil 
USA (Comer II), 607 F.3d 1049, 1053 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that after reinstating the case, the 
Fifth Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc; however, a number of the judges had to 
recuse themselves, causing the court to lack a quorum to rehear the case). 
109 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 321, 323 (“Simply because an issue may have political 
implications does not make it non-justiciable.”).  The Comer plaintiffs re-filed this case and, 
as this Article was being sent to print, the federal district court dismissed the case again.  
See Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00220-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Mar. 20, 2012). 
110 Id. at 392–93 (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 (1972)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
111 Amanda Bronstad, California’s Global Warming Suit Melts Away, LAW.COM (June 26, 
2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202431782836. 
112 See Peter Glaser & Douglas A. Henderson, Supreme Court Observations:  AEP v. 
Connecticut, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (June 22, 2011), http://wlflegalpulse.com/2011/06/22/ 
supreme-court-observations-aep-v-connecticut/ (noting that the Kivalina case remains 
pending in the Ninth Circuit). 
113 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538. 
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displacement of the federal common law claim occurred when Congress 
enacted the CAA, which delegates authority to the EPA, and not from 
any specific EPA action.  Thus, this decision echoed and reinforced the 
avenue for addressing emissions set forth in Massachusetts v. EPA.114  In 
an ironic way, Massachusetts, which advocates of climate change 
litigation had relied on to support the private tort suits, laid the predicate 
for the Court’s assertion that a “parallel track” through the common law 
did not exist to achieve the same end of regulating GHG emissions.115 
III.  AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO.’S IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
The import of the Supreme Court ruling in American Electric Power 
Co. is not limited to its displacement holding; the Court went to 
significant lengths to express the practical reasons why empowering the 
judiciary to regulate GHG emissions would be ill-advised regardless of 
the cause of action.116  This theme was first discussed during oral 
arguments, as Justice Ginsberg signaled that she was troubled that 
climate change litigation would “set up a district judge . . . as a kind of 
super EPA.”117   
In the Court’s opinion, she explained that judges do not have the 
basic tools the EPA has at its disposal to engage in the “complex 
balancing” necessary for determining appropriate levels of GHG 
emissions for American utilities and other GHG emitters.118  For 
example, she stated that “judges lack the scientific, economic, and 
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this 
order.”119  “[J]udges are confined by a record comprising the evidence 
the parties present.”120  Also, unlike Congress and EPA, “[j]udges may 
not commission scientific studies or convene groups of experts for 
advice, or issue rules under notice-and-comment procedures inviting 
input by any interested person, or seek the counsel of regulators” that 
                                                 
114 See id. at 2532–33. 
115 Id. at 2538.  As the Court even stated, “[i]f EPA does not set emissions limits for a 
particular pollutant or source of pollution, [s]tates and private parties may petition for a 
rulemaking on the matter,” but they may not pursue private tort litigation under a theory 
such as federal common law public nuisance.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
116 See id. at 2539 (noting that the prescribed order of decision-making under the Act is: 
(1) the expert administrative agency; and (2) federal judges, which is a reason to resist 
setting emissions standards by judicial decree). 
117 Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–38, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 
2527 (2011) (No. 10-174). 
118 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539. 
119 Id. at 2539–40. 
120 Id. 
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would facilitate an objective, comprehensive evaluation of GHG 
emission limits.121  The Court continued that it was “fitting that Congress 
designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as 
primary regulator of [GHG] emissions,”122 and that setting GHG 
emission limits “is undoubtedly an area ‘within national legislative 
power.’”123   
A. The Requirements of Common Law Liability Do Not Provide a Valid 
Process for Fairly Determining Who, If Anyone, Should Have to Restrict 
Their GHG Emissions  
The Supreme Court’s concerns with global climate change tort 
litigation appears to be that, regardless of the tort or court, it is 
impossible to assign liability in a legally principled, judicious manner.  
As suggested by the Court’s opinion, there are two hurdles common to 
all tort theories that cannot be overcome:  no defendant can be deemed 
the “cause” of an injury allegedly stemming from global climate change 
and judicially-available remedies will not cure, stop, or slow GHG 
accumulation in the atmosphere.  If a plaintiff cannot prove that the 
defendant caused her harm or the court cannot order an appropriate 
remedy, there is no liability and the courts cannot “regulate” the 
defendant’s conduct. 
1. Climate Change Injuries, Even if They Exist, Are Not Caused By Any 
Defendant 
The first task for any government body in regulating conduct is to 
determine which group of people or businesses must abide by its 
rulings.  As the Supreme Court noted, the EPA can decide whose GHGs 
to regulate if it chooses to do so.124  By contrast, courts cannot choose 
who to “regulate.”  First, they can only apply the law to those named in 
the litigation.  As history has shown, plaintiffs’ lawyers would prioritize 
companies perceived to have “deep pockets” and a major stake in the 
litigation such that they might settle or pay an award.  Other businesses 
and individuals that emit GHGs would not be before the court.125  In 
addition, all tort law, including public nuisance theory, can only subject 
an entity to liability, if the entity is a legal cause of the alleged injury; 
                                                 
121 Id. at 2540. 
122 See id. (“The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than individual 
district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.”). 
123 Id. at 2535 (emphasis added) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the 
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421 (1964)). 
124 See id. at 2537–39. 
125 See supra Part II.B (discussing climate change tort litigation). 
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there must be “some reasonable connection between the act or omission 
of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered.”126  
It has become clear through the cases to date that actual causation 
cannot be established in global climate change cases without grossly 
distorting the meaning of these requirements.127  The release of carbon 
dioxide or other GHGs is not particular to any individual company or 
industry; numerous human activities and natural occurrences release 
these gases into the atmosphere.  For example, GHGs are released 
through fossil fuel combustion at factories, power plants, and other 
manufacturing facilities as well as through exhaust from airplanes, ships, 
cars, trucks, and many other types of vehicles.128  These sources are also 
stationed throughout the world, with an estimated eighty-three percent 
of GHG emissions occurring outside of the United States.129 
Further, there are numerous natural sources of GHGs, including 
volcanic eruptions, ocean-atmosphere exchange (where the ocean 
absorbs and releases carbon dioxide), and, of course, the respiration 
processes of living, aerobic organisms (i.e., breathing).130  These GHGs 
are then mixed with all other GHGs that have been emitted over the past 
150 years in the atmosphere, where GHGs from any one source cannot 
be distinguished from any other.131  The allegations in these cases are 
                                                 
126 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (W. 
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
127 In tort litigation, a plaintiff alleging a climate change injury must be able to show that 
a defendant’s emissions are the actual cause of global climate change and, in turn, the 
specific injury alleged.  Also, the defendant’s conduct must have been the proximate cause 
of the alleged injury, i.e., the specific injury to the plaintiff must have been reasonably 
foreseeable as a result of the defendant’s conduct.  See Schwartz, et al., supra note 11, at  834; 
see FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.2 (1986) (“Through all the diverse 
theories of proximate cause runs a common thread; almost all agree that defendant’s 
wrongful conduct must be a cause in fact of plaintiff’s injury before there is liability.”). 
128 See Human-Related Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/co2_human.html (last updated Apr. 14, 
2001) (listing a variety of human activities that lead to carbon dioxide emissions). 
129 See Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, annex A, Dec. 
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (noting that under the Kyoto Protocol, the following six gases 
have been categorized as GHGs:  (1) carbon dioxide; (2) methane; (3) nitrous oxide; (4) 
hydrofluorocarbons; (5) perfluorocarbons; (6) and sulphur hexafluoride); see also Jane A. 
Leggett et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL 34659, China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Mitigation Policies 7 (2008) (stating that carbon dioxide is absorbed by naturally occurring 
activities such as forest management and land use). 
130 See Natural Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/emissions/co2_natural.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2011) (noting the 
primary natural processes that release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere). 
131 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 345 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that 
plaintiffs could not allege particular harms that would be caused directly by defendants’ 
actions, nor could they allege that the emissions alone would cause future harm). 
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that this 150-year accumulation and mix of GHGs has materially 
increased the earth’s air and water temperatures, melting polar ice, 
raising sea levels, and causing more frequent and intense weather 
events.  These events have, in turn, allegedly injured plaintiffs beyond 
that which would have occurred if the GHGs had not collected in the 
atmosphere.132 
Therefore, even if the allegations are true—and the Supreme Court 
“caution[ed]” that it “endorses no particular view of the complicated 
issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions and climate change”133—the 
six utilities named in American Electric Power Co. did not cause the 
alleged injuries.  First, the Supreme Court made clear that the defendants 
were not the actual, “but-for” cause of the states’ and land trusts’ specific 
alleged injuries.  The Court said that even the plaintiffs acknowledged 
that “[s]imilar suits could be mounted . . . against ‘thousands or 
hundreds or tens’ of other defendants fitting the description ‘large 
contributors’ to carbon-dioxide emissions.”134  The same is true for the 
defendants in Kivalina and Comer, as no one can say that any handful of 
companies caused a hurricane to strengthen or ice barrier to melt.135  
These companies also cannot be deemed the legal cause of the 
injuries, which looks at “the significance of the defendant’s conduct 
[and] the appropriate scope of liability,” as well as “heavy elements of 
moral and policy judgment.”136  The above Rube Goldberg-esque 
                                                 
132 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (noting plaintiffs’ claims that GHG emissions 
led to weather related tragedies); see also Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 314 (discussing 
how plaintiffs’ generally assert that these climate changes are adverse and seek damages 
without attempting to tie the alleged effect to any specific event or set of injuries). 
133 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533 n.2.  As this statement suggests, the law and 
policy arguments, both in American Electric Power, Co. and this Article, are independent of 
the scientific veracity of the factual allegations. 
134 Id. at 2540. 
135 It is said that: 
An intervening force is one which joins with the defendant’s conduct 
to cause the injury.  Such a force, whether it be human, animal, 
mechanical, or natural is considered intervening because it occurs after 
the defendant’s conduct.  An intervening force will only act to cut off 
proximate cause if it is characterized as superseding . . . .  [W]hile 
courts are quick to find negligence of a third party foreseeable and 
hence not superseding, criminal acts are often characterized as 
extraordinarily unforeseeable and hence superseding. 
JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 256 (1st ed. 2001).  Generally, a party is 
not liable unless it “increase[s] an unreasonable risk of harm through its intervention.”  
KEETON ET AL., supra note 126, at 305. 
136 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 167, at 408 (2000).  For example: 
[S]uppose that a surgeon negligently performs a vasectomy.  Because 
the surgery was negligently performed, the patient fathers a child.  The 
child, at the age of [thirteen], sets fire to the plaintiff’s barn.  Is the 
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causation allegations demonstrate the remoteness of the conduct to the 
harm alleged.  Specific injuries from Hurricane Katrina, for example, are 
not among the harms any reasonable person who emits GHGs would 
have foreseen as a result of its activities. 
Without the causation filter, no defendant could avoid future 
liability unless they stop all GHG emissions, which cannot occur so long 
as fossil fuels continue to be a staple of American energy consumption.  
Allowing such cases to proceed would mean that any time someone 
sustains an injury allegedly caused by global climate change, including 
droughts, severe weather, hurricanes, and warmer temperatures, the 
same defendants could be subject to liability over and over again.137 As a 
result, and in addition to these practical concerns, the inability to 
establish causation in these cases raises constitutional issues because 
defendants would be denied their due process safeguard of notice that it 
was potentially engaged in liability-inducing activities.   
2. There is No Remedy the Courts Could Order that Would Address 
the Alleged Injuries 
There also is no remedy the courts could order that would address 
the alleged injuries.  Even if plaintiffs won American Electric Power Co. 
and the six utilities named had “to cap [their] carbon dioxide emissions 
and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at least a 
decade,”138 the plaintiffs’ alleged harms would not be redressed.  The 
reduction—or even the elimination—of GHG emissions by any 
defendant, even under plaintiffs’ allegations, would have no effect on 
stopping or slowing climate change.  The multitude of other sources 
throughout the world would render such a remedy hollow.   Therefore, 
isolating the defendants in American Electric Power Co. could not, as 
plaintiffs’ suggest, lead to “[t]he appropriate amount of regulation in any 
particular greenhouse gas-producing sector.”139 
Further, given the lack of any overarching standards, different 
jurisdictions would undoubtedly develop different emission limits.  
What one judge decides is a reasonable limit for the defendant, another 
                                                                                                             
surgeon liable for the loss of the barn?  He was negligent in performing 
the vasectomy, and his negligence is a cause in fact of the fire and the 
loss of the barn. . . .  Courts are likely in such a case to say that the 
surgeon’s negligence is not a proximate cause of the harm done. 
Id. § 180, at 444. 
137 See Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (holding 
that risk contribution violates due process). 
138 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
139 Id. at 2539. 
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judge may decide is unreasonable.  Also, an emissions limit for one 
company or industry may not be reasonable for another.  This “lack [of] 
authority to render precedential decisions binding other judges, even 
members of the same court,” was a significant concern of the Supreme 
Court.140  The resulting liability system would create legal chaos.141 
Any regulation of GHGs, therefore, cannot be aimed at remedying a 
specific injury, but to address, to the extent needed, broad-based 
environmental allegations of climate change.  As the Supreme Court 
wisely observed, given modern society’s pervasive reliance on fossil 
fuels, not even Congress could “preemptively prohibit every discharge 
of carbon dioxide unless covered by a permit.”142  Rather, for each 
industry and operator, “standard[s] of performance” would have to be 
set based on long-term goals.143  As the Supreme Court explained, 
agencies under congressional authorization are uniquely competent to 
perform this task.144  Consider the balancing EPA undergoes in 
implementing the CAA.  It “must ‘tak[e] into account the cost of 
achieving [emissions] reduction and any nonair quality health and 
environmental impact and energy requirements.”145  It “may ‘distinguish 
among classes, types, and sizes’ of stationary sources in apportioning 
responsibility for emissions reductions.”146  It also “may waive 
compliance with emission limits to permit a facility to test drive an 
‘innovative technological system’ that has ‘not [yet] been adequately 
demonstrated.’”147 
 For these reasons, which are common to all tort theories, it would be 
arbitrary and unfair for any individual or group to be blamed for causing 
or be solely accountable for remedying a specific climate change injury.  
By going beyond its holding in American Electric Power Co. that the CAA 
displaced federal common law and laying the foundation for the above 
points, the Supreme Court provided a roadmap for how this decision 
should be followed in future climate change tort cases.   
                                                 
140 Id. at 2540. 
141 See supra Part II.B.2 (noting that the courts lack judicially manageable standards in 
such cases). 
142 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
146  Id. (citations omitted). 
147 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j)(1)(A)). 
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B. American Electric Power Co.’s Impact on Climate Change Going 
Forward 
Advocates of global climate change tort suits have downplayed the 
Supreme Court’s policy statements in American Electric Power Co., both in 
the media and in a briefing to the Ninth Circuit as to how American 
Electric Power Co. should be applied in Kivalina.148  In an effort to narrow 
the ruling, they have focused on the following three issues that may 
determine how lower courts will apply American Electric Power Co. to the 
cases before them.  As this section of the Article discusses, the Court’s 
roadmap should be followed, regardless of whether the controlling law, 
parties involved, or remedies sought are identical to American Electric 
Power Co. 
1. State vs. Federal Claims 
The first argument for climate change litigation proponents is that 
state common law claims remain fully viable for regulating GHG 
emissions.  The argument is based on the fact that American Electric Power 
Co. held that Congress displaced only federal common law claims and 
the legal analysis for why the federal claims were displaced does not 
apply to state claims. 
While the premise for this argument is true, the conclusion is 
inconsistent with American Electric Power Co.  First, the Court did not bar 
state common law climate change actions because those claims were not 
before the Court.  The Court noted at the end of its opinion that 
“plaintiffs also sought relief under state law, in particular, the law of 
each [s]tate where the defendants operate power plants.  The Second 
Circuit did not reach the state law claims because it held that federal 
common law governed.”149  Because the parties had not “addressed the 
availability of a claim under state nuisance law,” the Court left “the 
matter open for consideration on remand.”150  The Supreme Court’s lack 
of opportunity to squarely address state claims is far different from 
endorsing them. 
Second, from a legal perspective, Congress cannot “displace” state 
claims.151  To determine whether state claims remain viable, the Court 
would have to determine whether Congress, in enacting the CAA, 
                                                 
148 See Brief for Appellant, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 
863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2010). 
149 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (citations omitted). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
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expressly or impliedly preempted state actions.152  Preemption analyses 
are based on congressional intent rather than simply whether Congress 
entered the relevant field, which is the test the Court applied in holding 
that Congress displaced federal actions.153  The fact that the Court did 
not undertake a preemption analysis in American Electric Power Co. has 
been played up by climate change tort litigation advocates in hopes of 
finding a federal or state court judge that will allow a state-based claim 
to proceed beyond a motion to dismiss. 
The legal distinctions between federal and state actions, as well as 
displacement and preemption, though, do not overcome the Court’s 
statements of policy that the judiciary is simply not the appropriate 
branch for making determinations on whether and how to cap GHG 
emissions.154  The Court stated that there ought not be a “parallel track” 
of tort litigation, and EPA regulation does not distinguish parallel tracks 
of federal tort litigation from state tort litigation.155  The policy rationale 
is the same.  In oral argument, Justice Kennedy identified this point and 
the legal awkwardness of only having a federal cause of action before 
them.  In anticipation that some might bring such a state claim, he 
observed that “[i]t would be very odd”—in the illogical sense—for state 
courts to set national caps on GHG emission when federal courts are 
barred from doing so.156  The Court also wrote in its opinion that because 
of the national scope of this issue, “here, borrowing the law of a 
particular [s]tate would be inappropriate.”157  American Electric Power Co. 
simply did not create an opportunity for state courts to take these cases 
and endeavor to set national energy policy on emission caps.158 
2. Who Has Standing To Bring Which Claims? 
The second battleground is whether the plaintiffs bringing the action 
have constitutional standing to seek a remedy against the named 
defendants.  Constitutional standing is a case-by-case assessment, 
determined anew for the parties, cause of action, and facts in each 
individual case.  A plaintiff’s “irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing” is to show an “injury in fact” that is “fairly . . . trace[able] to 
                                                 
152 See id. (“[T]he availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the 
preemptive effect of the [CAA].”). 
153 Id. at 2537. 
154 See id. at 2539. 
155 Id. at 2538. 
156 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 
(2011) (No. 10-174). 
157 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2536. 
158 See id. at 2531. 
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the challenged action of the defendant” and “likely . . . redress[able] by a 
favorable decision.”159 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court determined that state 
attorneys general had constitutional standing to file an administrative 
law action against the EPA to require the EPA to make decisions 
regarding GHG emission standards.160  In distinguishing attorneys 
general from other types of plaintiffs, the Court wrote that “[i]t is of 
considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign 
[s]tate and not . . . a private individual.”161  The Court continued that 
under the CAA, “Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts 
(among others) by prescribing standards applicable to the emission of 
[GHGs]” and “recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge 
the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.”162  
Accordingly, “[g]iven that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in 
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to 
special solitude in our standing analysis.”163  The Court reasoned that the 
remedy sought, namely broad EPA regulations of GHGs, would reduce 
the risk that such harm would occur, thereby sufficiently redressing the 
harm Massachusetts alleged.164 
In American Electric Power Co., the Supreme Court was presented 
with the issue of whether the attorneys general possessed constitutional 
standing to bring a tort action against private entities to cap emissions.165  
The issue was not discussed in any detail.  The opinion simply states that 
four of the justices believed the issue was settled in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
and four justices would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article III 
standing.166  Thus, “by an equally divided Court, [it affirmed] the Second 
Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction.”167  Climate change litigation 
proponents will likely extrapolate the granting of standing in 
Massachusetts v. EPA and the affirmation of the Second Circuit’s granting 
of standing in American Electric Power Co. to conclude that the standing 
question has been answered:  Standing exists for global climate change 
cases generally, regardless of the plaintiffs bringing the cases or purpose 
of the action. 
                                                 
159 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
160 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007). 
161 Id. at 518. 
162 Id. at 519–20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
163 Id. at 520. 
164 See id. 
165 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). 
166 Id. at 2534. 
167 Id. at 2535. 
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Any fair reading of Lujan, Massachusetts v. EPA, and American Electric 
Power Co. suggests that such an argument should fail.  A court must 
engage in a fresh analysis of traceability and redressability in each case 
for the specific plaintiffs, specific defendants, specific harms alleged, and 
specific remedies sought.  With respect to attorney general suits over 
global climate change, just because the Court provided special standing 
to states to seek federal administrative action in Massachusetts v. EPA, it 
does not mean that they also have standing to bring tort suits or other 
actions alleging global climate change harms against individual 
defendants.  The Second Circuit in American Electric Power Co. glossed 
over this critical distinction in allowing state attorneys general standing 
for a climate change tort case, conceding only that “[s]tate standing is not 
monolithic and depends on the role a state takes when it litigates in a 
particular case.”168  Unfortunately, the four justices that would have 
extended standing to the attorneys general in the American Electric Power 
Co. tort action provided no guidance for future courts as to how the 
affirmation of the Second Circuit’s ruling should be applied to other 
cases. 
From a traceability and redressability standpoint, the two cases 
present very different issues.  As discussed above, the Court in 
Massachusetts explained that when Congress has afforded a procedural 
right to challenge an agency’s actions, litigants “can assert that right 
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 
immediacy” that satisfy standing.169  Thus, in Massachusetts, states 
needed to show only that the EPA improperly discounted or ignored 
evidence suggesting GHG emissions could generally lead to global 
climate change, and that regulating them would generally reduce the risk 
of the alleged climate change harms to the state.170  By contrast, a tort 
action against a private entity requires a plaintiff to prove standing with 
much greater specificity.  It must show a specific injury directly traceable 
to a particular defendant’s emissions and that the remedy sought against 
                                                 
168 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 335 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 
Connecticut v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2000)).  The court, having additionally 
determined that the case did not present non-justiciable political questions that would act 
to bar standing, went on to hold that the claimants satisfied the Supreme Court’s basic 
standing requirements.  Id. at 338.  The Supreme Court, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, laid 
out its basic standing analysis, which requires a claimant to show injury, causation, and 
redressability.  504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see supra Part II.B (discussing climate change tort 
litigation). 
169 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
170 See id. at 499. 
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that particular defendant would redress that specific injury.171  As 
discussed in the previous section, this presents an insurmountable 
hurdle.172  No such correlation can be made given the allegations that 
climate change is the result of 150 years of global emissions from all over 
the world comingling in the atmosphere.173 
It is abundantly clear, though, that none of these rulings provide any 
support for a finding that private plaintiffs have standing to bring global 
climate change tort suits against individual defendants.  Just the opposite 
is true.  In Massachusetts, the Court took pains to explain that its holding 
was premised on the fact “that [s]tates are not normal litigants for the 
purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.”174  Further, the four justices 
that would have granted standing in American Electric Power Co. clarified 
that Massachusetts v. EPA would only apply to “at least some plaintiffs,” 
implying that the private plaintiffs and possibly the City of New York 
would not have standing on their own.175  In Kivalina, therefore, the 
private community in Alaska will have to show that the melting of the 
sea ice barrier can be traced to the specific emissions of the defendants 
and that the remedy sought will redress that injury.  Also, the Comer 
plaintiffs will have to prove that Hurricane Katrina can be traced to the 
specific defendants’ emissions.  Case law suggests that the Supreme 
Court would not extend the standing granted to attorneys general in 
Massachusetts v. EPA to those cases. 
3. Does it Matter if Plaintiffs Seek Injunctive Relief, Damages, or 
Another Remedy? 
Another way climate change litigation proponents have tried to limit 
American Electric Power Co. is by arguing that the case only precludes 
actions that seek to directly regulate emission levels, namely injunctive 
relief and abatement, and not money damages.  In Kivalina, this 
argument has already surfaced, as plaintiffs have pointed to the Supreme 
Court’s statement of holding “that the [CAA] and the EPA actions it 
authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of 
carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”176  They 
                                                 
171 See id. at 517 (“[A] litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and 
particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to 
the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.”). 
172 See supra Part III.A (arguing that courts are not equipped to determine tort liability for 
climate change cases). 
173 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 336–38. 
174 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518. 
175 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). 
176 Id. at 2537 (emphasis added). 
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argue that they are only seeking damages to be compensated for the 
“severe” harm caused by global climate change, not to regulate or abate 
emissions.  Even if society determines that the current levels of emissions 
are to continue, the argument is that those who are severely injured by 
that conduct should still be able to seek monetary damages for those 
severe injuries.177 
While this argument may sound appealing, it is not consistent with 
the law.  The Supreme Court, as well as other courts, have consistently 
held and repeatedly reaffirmed that tort damages “regulate” conduct in 
the same way that state legislation and regulations do.178  In numerous 
preemption rulings, the Supreme Court has made clear that state 
“positive” law and tort law are equivalent because both impose legal 
requirements.179  This is because a person subject to liability for certain 
conduct will have to change that conduct to avoid future liability in the 
same way it would change conduct to comply with statutes and 
regulations.  For example, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,180 the Court 
held that common-law actions were preempted because a finding for 
monetary liability would impose state law requirements for labeling or 
packaging in addition to or different from those required under the 
applicable federal laws.181  In fact, the purpose of using tort litigation 
damages to regulate GHG emissions is implicit in the title of the 
Valparaiso University School of Law’s symposium—Civil Litigation as a 
Tool for Regulating Climate Change—for which this Article was written.  
Such tort claims, which do not go through legislative or regulatory 
hearings, have the potential to have a far greater, unfair, and inconsistent 
                                                 
177 In Kivalina, for example, the plaintiffs wrongly argued to the Ninth Circuit that “[t]he 
question of unreasonableness in a damages action is therefore not one of whether the 
defendant’s conduct is reasonable or unreasonable but rather one of who should bear the 
cost of that conduct.”  Brief for Appellant at 25, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 
2010). 
178 See infra Part IV.C (explaining why regulation through litigation is not feasible). 
179 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008) (“[E]xcluding common-law 
duties from the scope of pre-emption would make little sense.”). 
180 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
181 See id. at 432–33 (holding that a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act preempted common-law actions because they imposed state law 
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required 
under federal law); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000); see also 
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523–24 (1992) (holding that a provision of the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 preempted common law actions because they 
would impose state law requirements or prohibitions based on smoking and health with 
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes whose packages were labeled in 
accordance with federal law). 
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regulatory effect than statutes or regulations.182  This was the exact 
concern the Court expressed in opposing a separate track of civil liability 
on GHG emissions.183 
In addition, this argument has particular shortcomings within the 
tort of public nuisance.  This tort has specific rules as to when it can be 
used and seeking monetary damages for severe harms from a public 
nuisance is not one of them.  Under centuries of jurisprudence, monetary 
damages are only available when private plaintiffs are injured by a 
public nuisance in a way that is “different [in kind] from that suffered by 
other persons.”184  As the Restatement (Second) makes clear, “[i]t is not 
enough that [one] has suffered the same kind of harm or interference but 
to a greater extent or degree.”185 
Assuming, for example, that the allegations of plaintiffs in Kivalina 
and Comer are true, they are only suggesting that the public nuisance of 
global climate change has impacted them in a “severe” way (i.e., to a far 
greater degree than others).  Indeed, they have fully acknowledged that, 
even under their allegations, global climate change impacts weather 
patterns for everyone.  Simply claiming a “severe” climate change injury, 
which is how they distinguish their claims from American Electric Power 
Co., is not sufficient for recovering monetary damages under the tort of 
public nuisance.  As environmental attorneys have long-appreciated, 
“the thoroughly entrenched ‘special injury rule’ and its constant 
companion, the strict ‘different-in-kind’ test,” are gatekeepers that limit 
the availability of public nuisance actions.186 
Therefore, to state a claim for monetary damages from a public 
nuisance, the plaintiffs must first demonstrate whether a public nuisance 
exists and whether a particular defendant is responsible for it.  This 
requires proving the fundamental elements of the tort:  that 
                                                 
182 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (“[R]ules of law that judges and juries create or apply in such 
suits may themselves similarly create uncertainty and even conflict, say, when different 
juries in different [s]tates reach different decisions on similar facts.”). 
183 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011); see Appellants’ 
Supplemental Brief on AEP v. Connecticut, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobile Corp., 
No. 09-17490 (filed Nov. 4, 2011).  Professor Robert Reich, President Clinton’s Secretary of 
Labor, is often credited with coining the phrase “regulation through litigation.”  Robert B. 
Reich, Don’t Democrats Believe in Democracy?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000, at A22.  He has 
stated that lawsuits under this notion are “faux legislation, which sacrifices democracy.”  
Id.; see Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle M. Tedesco, Addressing Regulation Through Litigation:  
Some Solutions to Government Sponsored Lawsuits, 3 ENGAGE 109, 109 (2002); Victor E. 
Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery:  State Court Regulation Through Litigation Has 
Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1215 (2001). 
184 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. b (1979). 
185 Id. 
186 Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance:  Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury 
Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 759 (2001). 
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“unreasonable conduct by the tortfeasor . . . interfere[ed] with [a] public 
right”; the tortfeasor had “control of the public nuisance”; and the public 
nuisance was the factual and proximate cause of the alleged injuries.  
Only then can the appropriate remedy be considered.187  Our earlier 
writings provide a comprehensive discussion of the tort of public 
nuisance and what must be shown to succeed in a public nuisance claim 
generally and with respect to global climate change.188 
The bottom line is that under legal doctrine and public policy, as 
expressed in American Electric Power Co., lower courts should continue 
rejecting global climate change tort cases. 
IV.  THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF PERMITTING THE JUDICIARY TO 
REGULATE GHG EMISSIONS AND DETERMINE U.S. ENERGY POLICY 
If lower courts ignore the Supreme Court’s message and endeavor to 
set U.S. energy policy by focusing solely on allegations in litigation over 
GHG emissions, the practical results would likely be a disjointed, 
nonsensical U.S. energy policy.  As this section of the Article discusses, 
the supply of electricity and other energy sources would likely be 
compromised, and the resulting increase of energy costs to American 
consumers could push basic needs out of the reach of average 
Americans.  Further, this litigation would become a model for advocates 
of other policies not adopted through the political process, causing 
American courts to become a common destination for “regulating” all 
sorts of products and conduct. 
A. Picking Winners and Losers in Tort Litigation Would Disrupt Energy 
Supply in Ways that Would Not Follow Any Rational, Overarching 
Strategy for U.S. Energy Policy 
A significant shortcoming of having courts set emission limits, as 
discussed above, is that plaintiffs’ lawyers, in choosing whom to name as 
defendants, and judges, in deciding where to set emission levels, would 
get to pick the “winners” and “losers” in the global climate change 
debate.  The result would be a piecemeal approach to GHG emissions 
                                                 
187 Schwartz et al., supra note 11, at 818; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt. 
c (1979) (“If the conduct of the defendant is not of a kind that subjects him to 
liability . . . the nuisance exists, but he is not liable for it.”). 
188 See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance:  Maintaining 
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 552–61 (2006); Schwartz et al., 
supra note 11, at 834. 
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that might not comport at all with a well-reasoned, appropriate national 
energy policy.189 
The American Electric Power Co. case against the American utility 
companies demonstrates how this ad hoc approach might play out with 
the ability of the utilities to meet the electricity generation needs of 
American families and businesses.  Currently, only three sources can 
provide a steady, reliable output of energy for generating the “base” 
amount of electricity the public needs throughout the day:  coal, natural 
gas, and nuclear power.  Coal produces about forty-six percent of the 
electricity production in the United States, followed by natural gas at 
twenty-four percent and nuclear power at about twenty percent.190  If a 
judicially-imposed cap on emissions made coal and natural gas less 
affordable or available, utilities would have to immediately reduce fossil 
fuel emissions and rely on energy sources that do not emit GHGs—
which is the very goal of those filing these suits.  While these individuals 
and groups may be frustrated with the incremental approach being 
taken in Congress, it is clear that the blunt tool of imposing these results 
through the courts is not a realistic option. 
First, the technology for reducing fossil fuel emissions to be in 
compliance with such a court ruling may not be available or 
economically feasible, either immediately with respect to damage 
awards or for meeting deadlines in an abatement order.  This is not to 
say that progress is not being made.  Since the mid-1980s, the 
government has invested $3 billion to develop and test clean coal 
technologies.191  This approach has provided significant dividends, as 
new coal-burning power plants emit ninety percent less pollutants than 
plants they replace.192  As a result, while coal use has tripled since the 
1970s, regulated emissions from coal-based electricity has decreased by 
                                                 
189 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011) (noting that 
Congress should make these determinations, not federal judges on an “ad hoc, case-by-
case” basis).  Courts could, for example, choose to prioritize how energy is produced in the 
United States simply by adjusting arbitrary emission limits among coal-burning power 
plants and facilities consuming natural gas.  They could also impose emission limits that 
grind either or both activities to a halt.  The permutations are as endless as the 
inconsistencies that would predictably develop.  See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 
406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining how courts could regulate “by judicial 
fiat”); cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819) (“An unlimited power 
to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy . . . .”). 
190 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf. 
191 See Cleaning Up Coal, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, http://www.fe.doe.gov/education/ 
energylessons/coal/index.html (last updated Oct. 9, 2008). 
192 See Clean Coal Technology, NAT’L MINING ASS’N, http://www.nma.org/pdf/ 
fact_sheets/cct.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (citing findings of the National Energy 
Technology Laboratory). 
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nearly forty percent.193  President Obama has repeatedly asserted that his 
energy policy includes continued investment in clean coal technology.194  
This includes the development of “ultra-supercritical” units, which 
operate at higher efficiency levels, and carbon capture and storage 
techniques that minimize the release of carbon dioxide from coal 
generation.195 
Second, it is not realistic to think that other sources of energy, 
including nuclear, wind, and solar, can materially replace coal and gas.  
Nuclear power, the only other base-load source of electricity, is not 
positioned to be the “winner” in the global climate change debate.  Given 
safety and waste-disposal concerns,196 America has not invested in new 
generations of nuclear power plants, and the existing, aging plants are 
already producing at full capacity.  The remaining fuels, namely wind 
and solar, are not “base-load” sources of electricity; they provide two 
percent and one percent, respectively, of the United States’ power 
generation.197  They can only supplement the grid during peak times and 
facilitate discrete tasks,198 as both can only provide electricity 
                                                 
193 See id. 
194 See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-
union-address.  President G. W. Bush also supported development of clean coal 
technology.  See, e.g., Robin Acton, Bush Urges Clean Coal Technology for Electricity, TRIB. LIVE 
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_580555. 
html. 
195 See id.; see also Glaser, supra note 20, (manuscript at 35) (discussing “ultra-
supercritical” combustion technology). 
196 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-48, NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT:  
KEY ATTRIBUTES, CHALLENGES, AND COSTS FOR THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY AND 
TWO POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d1048.pdf; David Biello, Spent Nuclear Fuel:  A Trash Heap Deadly for 250,000 Years or a 
Renewable Energy Source?, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican. 
com/article.cfm?id=nuclear-waste-lethal-trash-or-renewable-energy-source&print=true. 
197 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND ELECTRICITY 
PRELIMINARY STATISTICS 2010, at 5 (2011) [hereinafter RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
AND ELECTRICITY], available at http://www.eia.gov/renewable/annual/preliminary/
pdf/preliminary.pdf; see also Sarah Pizzo, Note, When Saving the Environment Hurts the 
Environment:  Balancing Solar Energy Development with Land and Wildlife Conservation in a 
Warming Climate, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 123, 131 (2011) (noting that solar 
energy accounts for a small percentage of U.S. energy demand). 
198 As Julio Friedmann of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has explained, each 
alternative energy form is severely “limited by cost, limited by scale, limited by physics 
and chemistry, [or] limited by thermodynamics.”  James Fallows, Dirty Coal, Clean Future, 
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/12/ 
dirty-coal-clean-future/8307/.  Friedmann also stated that, “[s]olar and wind power are 
going to be important, but it is really hard to get them beyond [ten] percent of total power 
supply.’”  Id. 
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intermittently and in select areas of the country.199  Wind and solar farms 
also have met significant resistance.  As the “Cape Wind” project in 
Massachusetts has shown, wind farms are often opposed by local 
communities voicing concerns about aesthetics, noise, safety, navigation, 
property values, changes to the seascape, the impact on tourism, and 
environmental issues, such as disturbances to marine animal and 
migratory bird populations.200  Solar farms are opposed by land and 
wildlife conservationists because they require five to ten acres of land 
per megawatt of capacity.201 
The practical shortcomings of imposing a judicial remedy here were 
the same types of issues that weighed down the cap and trade legislation 
that failed to pass Congress in 2009 and 2010.  In the end, Congress and 
regulators have seen the wisdom of addressing each energy challenge in 
a nuanced way, shying away from any “one-size-fits-all” approach.202  
Indeed, developing technologies to facilitate greater reliance on 
alternative sources of energy has been a growing, stable part of 
America’s energy policy through targeted subsidies and tax credits.203  
This targeted, incremental approach will no doubt continue providing 
results, just as it has over the past forty years in reducing coal-related 
emissions and in raising gas mileage rates.204 
                                                 
199 California, Nevada, and Florida account for eighty-eight percent of solar power 
generation, followed by Colorado, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois, Arizona, North Carolina, and 
Pennsylvania.  See RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND ELECTRICITY, supra note 197, at 
11 (finding California, Nevada, and Florida each provide more than five times as much 
solar energy generation as any other state).  Solar power generation is negligible in most 
other states.  See id. 
200 See NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., LARGE-SCALE OFFSHORE WIND POWER IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/wind/pdfs/40745.pdf; Dominic Spinelli, Note, Historic Preservation 
& Offshore Wind Energy:  Lessons Learned from the Cape Wind Saga, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 741, 748 
(2010). 
201 For example, the solar mirror field proposed for just outside the Mojave National 
Preserve will consume some 3,400 acres (5.3 square miles).  See Ivanpah Solar Electric 
Generating System, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/
ivanpah/index.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2011). 
202 See, e.g., California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (seeking money damages from defendant automobile companies 
“for creating, contributing to, and maintaining a public nuisance”). 
203 See Moses, supra note 37, at 41 (discussing alternative energy incentives in the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007); Graab, supra note 64, at 2070–71 (noting that 
Congress has been aware of the need to decrease the United States’ dependence on oil and 
has attempted to create incentives for producers of renewable energy sources). 
204 See supra Part II.A (examining the development of GHG regulations as part of a 
broader U.S. environmental policy). 
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B. Courts, Unlike Regulations Through Congressional Authority, Cannot 
Soften Any Unfair, Disproportionate Impact the Regulations Would Have 
on American Consumers and Businesses 
Through the nuanced approach discussed above, Congress can also 
emphasize reforms that are mindful of the fact that costs associated with 
implementing new regulations are borne directly by energy consumers, 
businesses that rely on affordable energy to survive and compete, and 
energy sector workers.  As indicated, any isolated decision on GHG 
emissions will undoubtedly increase the costs of generating electricity,205 
curtail energy output,206 and cause energy producers to relocate 
operations outside of the reach of the new “regulations.”207  Unlike 
courts, Congress can find ways to reach these goals without infringing 
on the primary benefits of inexpensive energy, which has been a driving 
force in America’s economic success and led to a major increase in 
people’s standard of living and life spans for more than a century and a 
half.208 
As advocates for the poor and elderly have expressed over the past 
few years, limiting GHG emissions too much too quickly, whether 
through litigation, legislation, or regulation, would disproportionately 
impact their constituents.209  Already, American households earning 
between $10,000 and $30,000 are estimated to allocate twenty-three 
percent of their 2011 after-tax income to energy—a level more than twice 
the national average and a sixty-five percent increase over the past ten 
years.210  The Affordable Power Alliance,211 an umbrella organization of 
several advocacy groups, issued a report in 2010 showing that potential 
                                                 
205 The degree of such cost increases would depend on how “reasonable” a particular 
defendant’s emissions were, which, for reasons discussed throughout this section, would 
be difficult to estimate. 
206 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RECENT INCREASES IN 
ENERGY PRICES 1 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7420/07-21-
Energy%20DIST.pdf (discussing specific disruptions to the growth in energy supplies). 
207 See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, U.S. TORT LIABILITY 
INDEX:  2010 REPORT 9 (2010), available at http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/ 
20100525_Tort_Liability_Index_2010.pdf (discussing tort liability system as significant 
factor in the decision of businesses to enter a state). 
208 See Glaser, supra note 20, (manuscript at 47); see also Myron Ebell, Increase Access to 
Energy, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST., Jan. 19, 2011, at 19, available at 
http://cei.org/agenda-congress/increase-access-energy-0 (urging Congress to take various 
steps to make energy more affordable). 
209 See EUGENE M. TRISKO, ENERGY COST IMPACTS ON AMERICAN FAMILIES, 2001–2011 
(2011), available at http://www.americaspower.org/sites/default/files/Energy_Cost_ 
Burdens_on_American_Families_2011.pdf. 
210 See id. at 2. 
211 See About Us, AFFORDABLE POWER ALLIANCE, http://www.affordablepoweralliance. 
org/Aboutus.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
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EPA regulations on GHG emissions could cause gasoline and residential 
electricity prices to increase by fifty percent and industry electricity and 
natural gas prices to go up by seventy-five percent by 2030.212  EPA can 
consider these impacts during its notice and comment rulemaking, but 
courts cannot.  Nor can courts consider the impact of their “regulations” 
on government assistance programs, such as the Low Income Home 
Energy Assistance Program, which would need to be increased 
significantly if home-heating oil prices had to incorporate costs allegedly 
related to global climate change.213 
Should utilities not be able to generate sufficient electricity in 
compliance with a court order, the brown-outs in California from a 
decade ago can give a glimpse as to the impact an electricity shortage 
could have on communities.214  During the March 2001 eight hour rolling 
blackouts, the average electricity shutoff period was ninety minutes, 
which was projected to translate into twenty hours of outage per 
customer if the crisis were to continue over the summer.215  This 
projected impact included a $4.6 billion reduction in household income 
for Californians, a loss of nearly 136,000 jobs, and a $21.8 billion hit to the 
gross state output.216  Fortunately, that crisis was avoided, in part, by the 
ability of energy policymakers to make adjustments.  Policymakers 
would likely be hamstrung, though, if the brown-outs—whether more or 
less drastic than those projected for the summer of 2001—were caused by 
judicially-imposed limits that companies had to meet or be subject to 
massive, additional liability. 
Any such cost increases or energy shortages would have broad 
ripple effects.  This is why GHG emissions have been a focal point of 
both national and international policymakers.  If American businesses, 
from manufacturers to service companies, had to adjust to more 
expensive, less available energy, then they would be significantly 
disadvantaged.  Already, the recent rise in energy costs has taken its toll 
on American companies’ ability to compete internationally.  The 
                                                 
212 See AFFORDABLE POWER ALLIANCE, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE EPA ENDANGERMENT 
FINDING ON LOW INCOME GROUPS AND MINORITIES 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.Affordablepoweralliance.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yXQwPRYFUF8%3D
&tabid=40. 
213 See Jad Mouawad, Baby, It’s Going to Be Cold Outside, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at C1, 
C6. 
214 See, e.g., Rotational or Rolling Blackouts, CONSUMER ENERGY CENTER, 
http://www.consumerenergycenter.org/tips/blackouts.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2012) 
(discussing California’s recent history of rolling blackouts). 
215 See AUS CONSULTANTS, IMPACT OF A CONTINUING ELECTRICITY CRISIS ON THE 
CALIFORNIA ECONOMY ii (2001), available at http://www.caltax.org/member/taxletter/ 
Reference/AUSStudyfinal.pdf. 
216 See id. at ii–iii. 
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chemical industry, for example, was once dominated by American 
businesses.  But, as the Commerce Department has found, energy cost 
increases “have eroded the U.S. chemicals industry’s competitive 
position,”217 with the United States’ trade balance for chemicals declining 
from $16.8 billion in net exports in 1997 to $218 million in net exports in 
2006.218  “Chemical plants are closing in the United States, as companies 
move their facilities and dollars to countries where natural gas is 
cheaper, particularly to the Middle East where natural gas prices are a 
fraction of prices in the United States.”219  Metal, pulp, and paper 
industries have had similar experiences.220 
Other sectors would be deeply affected, regardless of international 
competition.  Consider the energy sectors themselves, as the natural gas 
industry alone employs over 600,000 workers directly and helps create 
an estimated three million other American jobs.221  The transportation 
industry would also be hit hard.  Rising energy costs have been a 
significant factor in the recent challenges facing the airline industry; and 
for taxi cab and truck drivers whose incomes are modest, energy costs 
constitute a significant part of their expenses.  Here, judicially-mandated 
reductions in GHGs could directly determine their economic viability.222 
These and other impacts of whether and how to reduce GHGs, 
which are central to U.S. energy policy, would not be before a court 
when fashioning an abatement plan, granting injunctive relief, or 
imposing billions of dollars of liability in tort cases over GHG emissions. 
C. The Validation of “Regulation Through Litigation”? 
The reason for the concern demonstrated in this Article over the 
potential lawlessness of global climate change litigation and the 
remedies that courts might impose is that these lawsuits lack the 
                                                 
217 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. INDUS., 
ENERGY POLICY AND U.S. INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS 5 (2007), available at 
http://ita.doc.gov/td/energy/energy%20use%20by%20industry.pdf. 
218 See id. 
219 Id. 
220 See id. at 6–7; see also id. at 7 (“High natural gas prices have led to the closure of all U.S. 
direct-reduced iron steel mills.”).  “From 2000 to 2005, the cost of fuels and purchased 
electricity for the pulp and paper industry increased from $6.9 billion to $8.8 billion, a 
[twenty-six] percent increase,” which has been attributed to “the closing of 232 mills and 
loss of 182,000 jobs.”  Id. 
221 See AMERICA’S NATURAL GAS ALLIANCE, NATURAL GAS:  WORKING FOR AMERICA, 
available at http://www.anga.us/media/40995/us%20economy.pdf (“[T]he natural gas 
industry supports [approximately] 2.8 million jobs in the United States.”). 
222 See Glaser, supra note 20, (manuscript at 49) (discussing the importance of low energy 
production costs for U.S. job growth during the 1980s and 1990s and how increased 
competition from China has eroded this advantage). 
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lynchpin that keeps all tort liability from being rudderless:  objective 
wrongdoing.  The defendants are not being sued over a product defect or 
negligent conduct, but because their products, like many other products 
in modern society, have inherent characteristics that are an essential part 
of the product or process itself.223  As a result, liability is determined by 
factors outside the control of those forced to pay.  Such super strict or 
absolute liability is only available in an extremely narrow set of 
circumstances, namely when one engages in abnormally dangerous 
conduct.  Courts have broadly rejected theories that would require 
manufacturers, in essence, to be insurers of their products.224  This is 
why, for example, courts do not subject beer manufacturers to liability 
for drunk driving accidents or sugar producers to liability for tooth 
decay or diabetes. 
Robert Reich, who was President Clinton’s Secretary of Labor, 
created a term in the 1990s for tort suits whose true purpose is political 
change:  “regulation through litigation.”  The massive liability exposure 
does not simply compensate a plaintiff, but regulates an industry.  At 
first, Secretary Reich favorably appreciated the power of such litigation 
to achieve what he thought were important policy objectives.  He soon 
reversed course, however, calling the lawsuits “faux legislation, which 
sacrifices democracy.”225  Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe, in 
applying the regulation through litigation concept to global climate 
change cases, editorialized against the litigation, saying “its very 
identification as a judicially redressable source of injury cries out for the 
response that the plaintiffs have taken their ‘petition for redress of 
                                                 
223 See Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Christopher E. Appel, Can Governments Impose 
a New Tort Duty to Prevent External Risks?  The “No-Fault” Theories Behind Today’s High-Stakes 
Government Recoupment Suits, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 923, 954 (2009). 
224 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(dismissing public-nuisance claims under Pennsylvania law); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson 
Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 133 (Conn. 2001) (dismissing public-nuisance claims under Connecticut 
law); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (dismissing 
public-nuisance claims under Florida law); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 
N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004) (dismissing public-nuisance claims under Illinois law); City of 
St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (“The city 
alleges in its complaint that before 1978 the defendants ‘produced, manufactured, 
processed, distributed, and marketed’ lead paint and pigment.”); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 
A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 203 
(App. Div. 2003) (dismissing public-nuisance claims under New York law); State v. Lead 
Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 434 (R.I. 2008) (“[T]he then Attorney General, on behalf of the 
State of Rhode Island . . . filed suit against various former lead pigment 
manufacturers . . . .”). 
225 See Reich, supra note 183. 
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grievances’ to the wrong institution altogether.”226  The Obama 
administration (“The Administration”) underscored this point when its 
Solicitor General submitted a brief to the Supreme Court to urge the 
Court to grant certiorari in American Electric Power Co.  The 
Administration explained that the Court should dismiss the suit because 
the “regulatory approach is preferable to what would result if multiple 
district courts—acting without the benefit of even the most basic 
statutory guidance—could use common-law [tort] claims to sit as 
arbiters of scientific and technology-related disputes and de facto 
regulators of power plants and other sources of pollution.”227 
These individuals, none of whom could be labeled as “conservative” 
in their views on public policy, recognized that process matters in the 
American legal system.  The ends of achieving a policy goal or revenue 
source, regardless of how desirous, do not justify the means of misusing 
the hallowed American civil justice system, particularly when doing so 
would cause undue hardship for American consumers and businesses.  
Ruling otherwise would invite any group that fails to get its way in the 
political arena to turn to the courts in hopes of finding a judge or 
appellate panel to agree with its agenda and endorse its litigation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has historically embraced the American tort 
system and, when rejecting preemption defenses, has argued for a 
vibrant civil litigation system for compensating individuals harmed by 
misconduct, and for correcting that misconduct.  Given this public policy 
backdrop, it is particularly noteworthy that the unanimous American 
Electric Power Co. Court, led by Justice Ginsburg, chose to expound on 
why tort litigation does not provide the tools for courts to decide 
emission standards for GHGs.  Rather, the Court was clear that global 
issues of “this order” should rest entirely with the executive and 
legislative branches.228  Lower courts should follow the Supreme Court’s 
blueprint and reject climate change tort cases, regardless of the 
                                                 
226 Laurence H. Tribe, Joshua D. Branson & Tristan L. Duncan, Too Hot for Courts to 
Handle:  Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine 12 (Wash. 
Legal Found., Working Paper No. 169, 2010), available at 
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP.pdf. 
227 See Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority Supporting Petitioners at 1617, Am. Elec. 
Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (June 20, 2011) (No. 10-174). 
228 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–40 (2011) (concluding 
that these issues should be left to the political branches because federal courts are ill 
equipped to deal with these issues). 
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combinations and permutations of plaintiffs and defendants or how 
creative and inviting the pleadings may seem. 
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